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On April 13, 2020, Mary turned to her obstetrician (OB/GYN) questioning whether to go 
through with her pregnancy in the time of COVID-19.1 “I would do it . . . I mean, in different 
circumstances I might continue the pregnancy. But now?”2 The OB/GYN is empathetic, though 
its effect hidden behind a surgical mask.3 Mary continues, “[h]ow could I be pregnant during this 
pandemic . . . [h]ow could I even get to appointments . . . what if I got sick?”4 With three children 
                                                 
∗ Juris Doctor Candidate class of 2022 at Mitchell Hamline School of Law; Bachelor of Science in Mechanical 
Engineering, University of Saint Thomas, 2014. I would like to thank Professor Michael K. Steenson for his 
valuable comments and suggestions, as well as my colleagues on Mitchell Hamline’s Law Journal of Public 
Policy and Practice for their aid in editing and tireless effort. All errors are my own. 
1 Maryl G. Sackeim, Protecting Access to Abortion During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 39(8) HEALTH AFFS. 1456, 
1456 (2020). 
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at home, Mary’s presence at an abortion clinic during the pandemic not only affects the health and 
safety of herself and her pregnancy but also the health and wellbeing of her family. 
Women in Mary’s position face unique complications during the recent pandemic. Though 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists considered abortion an essential “time-
sensitive service,” some state governors issued executive orders suspending the practice in the 
early weeks of the pandemic.5 Because of safety concerns, people may increasingly favor self-
managed abortion procedures without in-person consultation.6 According to Aid Access, the only 
online abortion telemedicine service in the United States, requests for self-managed medication 
abortions in the United States increased 27% between March 20 and April 11 of 2020.7 This 
phenomenon may stem from fears of infection by the COVID-19 virus as well as an inability to 
access abortion clinics due to childcare or transit disruptions.8 The World Health Organization 
(WHO) recommends telemedicine and self-managed abortion care during the pandemic, but this 
requires changing medical abortion policies for in-person dispensing of mifepristone, a drug used 
in medical abortions.9 
On May 27, 2020, counsel for the American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists 
filed a complaint for preliminary injunctive relief against the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) 
to forego the in-person dispensing requirement during a global pandemic.10 Plaintiffs argue that 
this mandatory in-person dispensing policy unduly burdens patients’ constitutional right to seek 
                                                 
5 Id. at 1457; see B. Jessie Hill, Essentially Elective: The Law and Ideology of Restricting Abortion During the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, 106 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 99 (2020) (outlining litigation in the wake of state attempts to limit 
abortion access under executive orders limiting “non-essential” or “non-urgent” medical procedures). 
6 Abigail R.A. Aiken et al., Demand for Self-Managed Online Telemedicine Abortion in the United States During 
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic, 136(4) OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 835, 835–36 (2020). 
7 Id.  
8 Id. at 837. 
9 Id. 
10 Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. U.S. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183, 197 (D. Md. 2020). 
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an abortion.11 While the pandemic brings uncertainty to many in Mary’s situation, there is also a 
growing uncertainty regarding the judiciary’s interpretation of the constitutional right to safe and 
legal abortion.   
In the wake of Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court greatly expanded 
constitutional protection for women by establishing a fundamental right to obtain a safe and legal 
abortion in the first trimester of gestation without governmental interference.12 Nineteen years 
later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court reaffirmed a woman’s fundamental right to a safe 
and legal abortion but allowed government regulation in the first trimester, effectively limiting the 
constitutional protection afforded to abortion.13 “Only where state regulation[s] impose[] an undue 
burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart” 
of this fundamental right.14  
In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Supreme Court again expanded the 
constitutional protection for a woman’s right to a safe and legal abortion by requiring a deeper 
judicial look into the medical effects of a law regulating abortion under Casey’s undue burden 
standard.15 Last year, the Court’s plurality opinion in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo 
indicated that the justices could no longer agree on the proper interpretation of Casey.16  
The realization of women’s fundamental right to abortion not only faces uncertainties 
brought by a global pandemic, but also uncertainties in judicial interpretation and application of 
that right. In this article, I will examine the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on abortion rights. 
                                                 
11 Id. at 211–17. 
12 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
13 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
14 Id. at 874 (emphasis added). 
15 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016). 
16 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020). 
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Then, I will review whether growing disagreements in applying Casey’s undue burden standard 
would again limit constitutional protections to the fundamental right to abortion in the time of 
COVID-19 and in future cases. 
II. ORIGIN OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY 
 
Before addressing substantive law on abortion rights in the United States, it is important to 
understand a court’s approach to fundamental rights in the Constitution. 
First, courts must determine whether a right is fundamental. Generally, courts determine a 
fundamental right in historical terms. A fundamental right is a liberty “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition.”17 Other scholars advocate that fundamental rights are those 
supported by a moral consensus within society.18 No matter the perspective, a fundamental right 
must be one that a court sees as requiring special protection from governmental intrusion. If a 
fundamental right is at stake, a challenged law must survive strict scrutiny by a court; if not, then 
the challenged law need only survive an intermediate or rational basis level of scrutiny.19  
Courts will uphold a law unless it “prejudice[s] against discrete and insular minorities[.]”20 
If a law affects minorities, then a court “may call for a correspondingly more searching [thorough] 
judicial inquiry.”21 Simply, if a law unjustly applies a suspect classification based on an immutable 
characteristic (race, gender, national origin) then a court will apply its most thorough review 
                                                 
17 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
18 Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 
83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973); see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (noting that denationalization for 
military desertion was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because this 
protection for individuals against excessive governmental treatment “must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 
19 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11:3 (3d ed. 2019). 
20 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (holding that a Congressional Act 
prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounds was constitutional and did not require 
heightened judicial scrutiny because ample evidence of health concerns reinforces its purpose). 
21 Id. 
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(known as strict scrutiny) to that law.22 
Second, if a law infringes on a fundamental right then the government must show a 
compelling state interest that justifies its infringement of that right.23 If the infringed right is not 
fundamental, then a court only requires an important or legitimate interest justifying the 
government’s infringement.24 For instance, in abortion cases, the fundamental right at play is the 
individual woman’s right to choose while the governmental interest is the health and preservation 
of life for both the mother and child. Courts must decide whether government’s justification for 
laws regulating a woman’s right to abortion sufficiently justify the law’s continuation. 
Finally, even if the government shows a sufficiently compelling or legitimate interest, it 
must also show that the law is necessary to achieve that interest.25 To do this, government must 
prove it could not achieve its claimed interest through less restrictive means than by infringing the 
fundamental right. For a law impeding a fundamental right backed by compelling governmental 
interest, it must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest; for a law impeding other rights not 
guaranteed by the Constitution and backed by a legitimate governmental interest, it must be only 
substantially related to achieving that interest.26 Thus, if the government attempts to regulate a 
fundamental right, then the law infringing that right must do so as little as possible. If there is no 
fundamental right at issue, then courts will give broader deference to the legislature. Generally, to 
                                                 
22 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a law prohibiting interracial marriage discriminated 
one’s immutable characteristic of race and ruled unconstitutional under strict scrutiny); see Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that a law discriminated one’s immutable characteristic of national origin but 
national security interests justified its enactment); see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that a 
law discriminating based on gender dealt with an immutable characteristic and calls for strict scrutiny analysis); see 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that laws impacting citizens with a mental 
disability is not discrimination based on an immutable characteristic requiring strict scrutiny). 
23 Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
24 RICH, supra note 19, at § 11:8. 
25 Id. § 11:4. 
26 Id. § 11:3. 
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Level of Court Scrutiny Required Level of 
Government Interest 
Required Scope of the 
Contested Law 





Table 1: Standards of Review27 
 
Courts use this framework to determine the extent of a fundamental right’s constitutional 
protection from government intrusion. 
A.  Early Interpretation of Reproductive Autonomy: A Broader Right to Privacy 
 
The first expansion of women’s right to privacy over reproductive autonomy occurred eight 
years before Roe v. Wade, paving the way for privacy rights extending to marriage, sexual 
orientation, and abortion.28 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of a 
Connecticut law criminalizing both the use of contraceptives and the aiding of patients in 
preventing conception through contraceptives.29 Appellants advised married couples on 
appropriate ways to prevent conception through contraceptives.30 They argued that the law 
banning use and advisement of contraceptives violated the patient’s personal liberty under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 In a 7-2 plurality decision, the Supreme Court 
                                                 
27 Michael K. Steenson, Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, “Constitutional Law: Liberties” 
(Feb. 2019). 
28 Lesson Plan: Landmark Supreme Court Case: Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), CSPAN CLASSROOM (Apr. 4, 
2018). 
29 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 480–82; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (noting that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law”). 
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held Connecticut’s law unconstitutional because of its invasion into a person’s personal sphere of 
privacy as protected by the Constitution even though the words “right to privacy” are not in its 
text.32 
Conscious of this, Justice Douglas addressed where to find this “right to privacy” within 
the Constitution. He began by stating what the Court was not doing. “We do not sit as a super-
legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, 
business affairs, or social conditions.”33 To determine the extent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protection, the Court notes that other amendments in the Constitution also extend to rights not 
found in its text.34   
The [right to] association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the 
Bill of Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice—
whether public or private or parochial—is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to 
study any particular subject or any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has 
been construed to include [a guarantee] of those rights.35 
 
The First Amendment protects not only speech and the press, but also a right to distribute and 
receive information.36 These examples “suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras [fringe rights], formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life 
and substance.”37 Simply, protections of individual action fulfilling the principles put forth in the 
                                                 
32 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (holding that Defendants had standing to bring the case because this law criminally 
convicts them in serving married couples but third party standing in abortion cases is another area of dispute); see 
Brandon L. Winchel, Note, The Double Standard for Third-Party Standing: June Medical and the Continuation of 
Disparate Standing Doctrine, 96(1) Notre Dame L. Rev. 421 (2020); Stephen J. Wallace, Note, Why Third-Party 
Standing in Abortion Suits Deserves a Closer Look, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1369 (2009). 
33 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.; see Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the right to educate one’s children as one 
chooses applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
(holding that the right to study the German language applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).  
36 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482; see Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (holding that a city 
ordinance prohibiting distribution of pamphlets and advertisements at individual’s homes violated a Jehovah’s 
Witness’ implicit First Amendment right to distribute and receive information). 
37 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
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First Amendment give weight and substance to this fundamental right. To fully protect a street 
corner advocate’s right to free speech, the Constitution must also protect their right to distribute 
ideas through their chosen means. 
 Similarly, various amendments, including the First Amendment’s right to association, 
guarantee an individual’s “zone of privacy” and so shows its importance to the liberty of American 
citizens.38 The Ninth Amendment’s declaration that all rights listed in the Constitution “shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people” lends weight to a general right to 
privacy from government intrusion.39 
 In Griswold, Justice Douglas concluded that the Connecticut law forbidding women’s use 
of contraceptives regulates “a relationship lying within th[is] zone of privacy created by several 
fundamental constitutional guarantees.”40 The intimate marriage relationship is an area of privacy 
in which laws having a “governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally 
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and 
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”41 Though not stated, Justice Douglas alludes to 
the idea that a law infringing a right so fundamental to citizens, such as private actions within a 
marital relationship, must be narrowly tailored. 
 Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion, agreed that the concept of one’s personal 
liberty “is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights” when read with the Ninth 
                                                 
38 Id. (noting the Third Amendment’s prohibition to quartering soldiers without the homeowner’s consent 
expresses a privacy right, the Fourth Amendment’s right of the people to be secure from unreasonable government 
intrusion expresses a privacy right, while the Fifth Amendment guarantees a defendant may protect themselves in 
certain privacy rights from which government may not cross); see U.S. CONST. amends. III, IV & V; Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that this right to privacy extends to not only private property but also to a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in semi-public areas). 
39 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; see U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
40 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
41 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)). 
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Amendment.42 Its language shows that “the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are 
additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside 
those fundamental rights specifically mentioned” elsewhere in the Constitution.43 Though the 
legislature may make laws as they see fit, Justice Goldberg “do[es] not believe that this includes 
the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens[.]”44 This Connecticut law 
violating a marriage relationship’s fundamental right to privacy can only stand if the government 
shows an “interest which is compelling.”45 Connecticut’s legitimate (but not compelling) interest 
in protecting marital relationships “can be served by a more discriminately tailored statute, which 
does not . . . sweep unnecessarily broadly” in banning all use of contraceptives.46 Justice White, 
concurring in Griswold, held that laws intruding on one’s fundamental right to privacy must be 
subject to strict scrutiny, backed by a compelling governmental interest, and narrowly tailored to 
meet that interest.47 
 In dissent, Justice Black disagrees with this broad constitutional right to privacy. Though 
Justice Black thought this law was offensive, he would have held it as constitutional.48 Defendants 
knowingly engaged in advising married couples to violate this law.49 “Merely because some 
speech was used in [this conduct] . . . [the Court is] not . . . justified in holding that the First 
Amendment forbids the State to punish their conduct.”50 The plurality opinions discuss a 
constitutional right of privacy “as though there is some constitutional provision . . . forbidding any 
                                                 
42 Id. at 486–87. 
43 Id. at 488. 
44 Id. at 496. 
45 Id. at 497–98. 
46 Id. at 498. 
47 Id. at 503. 
48 Id. at 507. 
49 Id. at 508. 
50 Id. 
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law ever to be passed which might abridge the ‘privacy’ of individuals. But there is not.”51 Justice 
Black warns that this type of constitutional interpretation distorts the textual meaning to give it the 
flexibility required to meet the Court’s preferential outcome.52   
 The decision in Griswold greatly expanded what liberties the Supreme Court considers as 
a constitutionally protected fundamental right.  
B.  Abortion Rights in the Twentieth Century: An Established Fundamental Right and Its Unduly 
Burdened Demotion 
 
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court established a woman’s fundamental right to an abortion 
free from governmental regulation during the first trimester.53 In Casey, the Court reaffirmed this 
right but removed Roe’s absolute protection to a woman’s fundamental right in the first trimester.54 
This development limits the Constitutional protection to one’s privacy for abortion. 
In Roe, the Court analyzed a Texas law, and similar Georgia law, making it a crime to 
procure, or attempt to procure, an abortion except to save the life of the mother.55 Jane Roe was 
an unmarried woman seeking an abortion but could not do so because her life was not in danger if 
the pregnancy continued.56 Like Griswold, Roe claimed this Texas law violated her right to 
personal privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.57 But the Court 
resisted Griswold’s broad analysis and looked to history as a supplement.58 
Justice Blackmun, in a plurality opinion, set out a brief history of some cultures embracing 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 509. 
53 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that after the first trimester, the state’s interest grows legitimate 
and even compelling as the pregnancy progresses).  
54 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (holding that the government’s interest in protecting 
life need only be legitimate and not compelling). 
55 Roe, 410 U.S. at 117–18. 
56 Id. at 120. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 118–46. 
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the open practice of abortion.59 Generally in common law, governments applied harsher criminal 
penalties on abortions after the moment of “quickening” (first recognizable movement of the fetus 
in utero).60 Historically, United States laws penalized aborting both a quickened and un-quickened 
fetus, but the diminished penalties of aborting an un-quickened fetus suggested to the Court that 
an individual’s right to abortion was stronger early in pregnancy.61 
By 1973, danger to the mother’s life during an abortion procedure decreased with the 
introduction of modern medical techniques.62 With the aid of antibiotics, “data indicat[ed] that 
abortion in early pregnancy . . . prior to the end of the first trimester . . . [was] now relatively 
safe.”63 Given this information, the Court was ready to follow Griswold’s lead: “[t]his right of 
privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy[,]” and so is a fundamental right.64 
To protect this right, the Court determined that the government may not regulate abortion 
within the first trimester of pregnancy.65 But it also acknowledges that as the embryo grows during 
pregnancy, the government’s increasing interest in protecting the life of the embryo overtakes the 
woman’s fundamental right to an abortion.66 The Court holds that after the first trimester, “the 
right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that right is not unqualified and must 
be considered against important state interests in regulation [to preserve life].”67 
                                                 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 132, 138 (noting that an 1821 Connecticut law charging a misdemeanor for abortion of an un-quickened 
fetus and second-degree manslaughter for abortion of a quickened fetus). 
61 Id. at 139. 
62 Id. at 149. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 152–53 (“only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ . . . are included in this guarantee of 
personal privacy.”). 
65 Id. at 163. 
66 Id. at 153.  
67 Id. at 154 (emphasis added). 
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The right to abortion appears to require strict scrutiny in the first trimester, but then 
diminishes to a lower level of judicial scrutiny over time as the government’s interest in the 
preservation of life increases. The Court ultimately establishes a three-trimester framework to 
determine where individual and government interests are at their highest.68 
 
The three-trimester framework creates a zone of privacy around first trimester abortions in which 
there is no justifiable governmental regulation. This protection expands women’s right to an 
abortion and privacy from government intrusion.  
 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist commended the historical and legal analysis but does not 
believe that a right to privacy is involved.69 He believed that the Court’s “conscious weighing of 
competing factors . . . is far more appropriate to a legislative [body].”70 
 The social impacts of Roe v. Wade are apparent. Before Roe, illegal abortion estimates 
                                                 
68 Id. at 163. 
69 Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. at 173. 
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ranged between 200,000 and 1,200,000 per year in the 1950’s and 1960’s.71 In 1969, illegal 
abortions in New York City accounted for 23% of all pregnancy-related hospital admissions.72 In 
1973, 36% of abortions occurred at or before eight weeks of pregnancy; today, 91.4% of all legal 
abortions occur within the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy.73 Abortion counseling has also 
changed. At the time of Roe, counselors saw themselves as advocates.74 Physicians did not know 
their role in this now nationally legal operation. After legalization, counsellors became advisors, 
informing patients of their options moving forward as well as providing emotional counseling to 
women having moral hesitations with the procedure.75 “The political debate over abortion has 
largely ignored the public health fact that the Roe v. Wade decision did not create or change the 
need for abortion; legalization simply made abortion safe.”76 As of 2013, 0.3% of 1.2 million 
abortion patients per year experience a complication requiring hospitalization.77 Between 1973 
and 2014, doctors performed more than fifty million abortions in the United States, equating to 
more than one million abortions per year.78  
 Nineteen years after Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court approached the fundamental right to 
abortion again in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act of 1982 
                                                 
71 Medical and Social Health Benefits Since Abortion was Made Legal in the U.S., PLANNED PARENTHOOD, 
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/uploads/filer_public/eb/38/eb38bdf9-7ebb-4067-8758-
13d28afa1d51/pp_med_soc_benefits_abortion_final_1.pdf (last updated Jan. 2015). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Carole Joffe, The Politicization of Abortion and the Evolution of Abortion Counseling, 103(1) AM. J. OF PUB. 
HEALTH, 57, 59–60 (2013). 
75 Id. at 60–62. 
76 Susan Yanow, It Is Time to Integrate Abortion Into Primary Care, 103(1) AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH, 14, 14–15 
(2013). 
77 Id. 
78 Stephen A. McCurdy, Abortion and Public Health: Time for Another Look, 83(1) THE LINACRE Q. 20, 24 
(2016); but see CDCs Abortion Surveillance System FAQs, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 
https://cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/data_stats/abortion.htm (last updated Nov. 25, 2020) (providing the number of 
reported abortions throughout the United States between 2009–2018 totaling 6,790,706 equating to 679,071 of 
reported abortions per year). 
13
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required a woman seeking an abortion to give her informed consent to the tending physician while 
receiving certain information within twenty-four hours of the procedure.79 It also required married 
women to sign a statement proving that she notified her husband of her intended abortion.80 In a 
5-4 plurality opinion, the Court reaffirmed a woman’s fundamental right to an abortion.81 But it 
rejected Roe v. Wade’s three-trimester framework and its prohibition of government interference 
within the first trimester of pregnancy.82 Instead, the Court held that a fetus’ viability, 
. . . is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing 
a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in 
reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights 
of the woman.83  
 
In cases between Roe and Casey, courts “decided that any regulation . . . must survive strict 
scrutiny, to be sustained only if drawn in narrow terms to further a compelling state interest.”84 
But the Court in Casey noted that this interpretation conflicts with Roe v. Wade; the government 
“has legitimate interests in the health of the woman and in protecting the potential life within 
her.”85 
 Under Casey, laws regulating abortion are unconstitutional “[o]nly where [it] imposes an 
undue burden on a woman’s ability” to get an abortion.86 An undue burden means a law with “the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus.”87 Government regulations “which do no more than create a structural mechanism 
                                                 
79 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 845–46. 
82 Id. at 872–73. 
83 Id. at 870. 
84 Id. at 871. 
85 Id. (emphasis added) (noting that this fundamental right does not call for strict scrutiny, unlike other 
fundamental rights, but rather a lower level of scrutiny). 
86 Id. at 874. 
87 Id. at 877. 
14





by which the State . . . may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if 
they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”88 
 In Casey, the Court held that the government’s interest to inform a patient of relevant health 
risks about abortion justified its informed consent requirement.89 This portion of the law is a 
structural mechanism that does not amount to a substantial obstacle in obtaining an abortion.90 But 
the law’s requirement for proof of spousal consent may pose a substantial obstacle to a patient 
seeking an abortion.91 “Many may fear devastating forms of psychological abuse from their 
husbands, including verbal harassment, threats of future violence . . . withdrawal of financial 
support, or the disclosure of the abortion to family and friends.”92 This portion of Pennsylvania’s 
law is unconstitutional because it places a substantial obstacle unduly burdening a woman’s right 
to abortion.93 
 Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, said the Court did not go far enough. “A state-
imposed burden on the exercise of a constitutional right is measured both by its effects and by its 
character: A burden may be ‘undue’ either because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a 
legitimate, rational justification.”94 Justice Stevens argued that the informed consent requirement 
is also unconstitutional because “such a delay serves [no] useful and legitimate purpose.”95 This 
interpretation calls for a higher level of judicial scrutiny throughout all three trimesters. 
 Though Roe expanded women’s fundamental right to privacy and access to safe and legal 
                                                 
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 882. 
90 Id. at 883. 
91 Id. at 893. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 893–94. 
94 Id. at 920. 
95 Id. at 921. 
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abortion free from governmental intrusion, Casey changed the character of this fundamental right 
and limited its protection. The government may now regulate abortion early in pregnancies as long 
as it does not unduly burden abortion access. The fundamental right to abortion does not call for a 
compelling governmental interest with laws narrowly tailored to meet that interest, but only a 
legitimate governmental interest with laws substantially tailored to meet that interest.96 
C.  Abortion Rights in the Twenty First Century: A Balancing Interpretation with Signs of 
Disfavor 
 
Both Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo 
again tested the Supreme Court’s interpretation of laws regulating a woman’s right to abortion.97 
In Whole Woman’s Health, a 5-4 plurality opinion, Texas abortion providers sued to 
invalidate two laws regulating their clinics.98 An admitting-privileges requirement directed 
physicians who perform abortions to have active admitting privileges at a hospital no farther than 
thirty miles from the clinic, while a surgical-center requirement compelled abortion facilities to 
have minimum safety standards equivalent to ambulatory surgical centers.99 
While the District Court invalidated these regulations as unduly burdening a woman’s right 
to abortion, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed that ruling as inconsistent with the 
undue burden standard established in Casey.100 It expressed the standard as a state law “regulating 
previability abortion is constitutional if: (1) it does not have the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus; and (2) it is 
                                                 
96 Id. at 871. 
97 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016); June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 
S. Ct. 2103, 2112 (2020). 
98 Whole Woman’ Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 2301. 
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reasonably related to (or designed to further) a legitimate interest.”101 
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, held that this was an incomplete interpretation of 
Casey because the first element “requires . . . the courts [to] consider the burdens a law imposes 
on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer.”102 This definition, the dissent 
argued, is the Supreme Court’s attempt to apply heightened judicial scrutiny when analyzing 
Texas’ law because it may affect a woman’s fundamental right to abortion.103   
 Texas first argued that the benefit of the admitting-privileges requirement is to “help ensure 
that women have easy access to a hospital should complications arise during an abortion 
procedure.”104 The Supreme Court pushed back with medical testimony noting that complications 
were rare in early pregnancy abortions.105 The highest rate or major abortion complications, 
including those requiring hospital admission “was less than one-quarter of 1%.”106 “The [district] 
court found that ‘[t]he great weight of evidence demonstrates that, before the [admitting-privileges 
requirement’s] passage, abortion in Texas was extremely safe with particularly low rates of serious 
complications and virtually no deaths occurring on account of the procedure.’ Thus, there was no 
significant health-related problem that the new law helped to cure.”107 The law did not appear to 
accomplish its alleged benefit.  
                                                 
101 Id. at 2303. 
102 Id. at 2309 (emphasis added); see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98 (1992) (performing this 
balancing on a spousal notification provision); see also id. at 889–901 (performing a balancing on a parental 
notification provision); id. at 878 (“[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”). 
103 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that this definition of “the undue-
burden test [is] something much more akin to strict scrutiny.”). 
104 Id. at 2311. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. (noting that a study of 54,911 abortions recorded complications in 2.1% of patients, and 0.23% of those 
complications required hospital admission). 
107 Id. (citation omitted). 
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Texas’ law also posed a substantial obstacle in the way of a woman’s ability to have an 
abortion because of its impact on local abortion clinics. Since many clinics were not within thirty 
miles of a hospital, eight clinics closed before the law’s effective date and eleven more closed soon 
after.108 “These closures meant “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased crowding” 
effectively limiting the locations in which a woman could access a safe and legal abortion.109 The 
admitting-privileges requirement placed a substantial obstacle to abortion access and provided 
minimal medical benefits to patients.110 The Supreme Court held that the admitting-privileges 
requirement unconstitutionally placed an undue burden on the fundamental right to abortion.111 
Texas next argued that the surgical-center requirement establishes high safety standards in 
local clinics to protect women during their procedure should complications arise.112 The Supreme 
Court, however, noted that safety “risks are not appreciably lowered for patients who undergo 
abortions at ambulatory surgical centers as compared to nonsurgical-center facilities.”113 
Moreover, medically-induced abortions rarely have complications and those that do arise usually 
occur after a patient has left the facility.114 Renovating clinics to bring the facility up to ambulatory 
surgical standards also posed an economic burden.115 Unaffordable renovations may force closures 
leaving the few open clinics with strained capacity.116 The surgical-center requirement also placed 
a substantial obstacle in the path of women attending an open clinic, provided minimal benefits, 
                                                 
108 Id. at 2312. 
109 Id. at 2313. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 2300–01. 
112 Id. at 2314. 
113 Id. at 2315. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 2296–97 (noting that upgrade renovations of existing clinics would cost between $1.5–$3 million dollars 
to comply with ambulatory surgical requirements). 
116 Id.; see id. at 2299 (noting that if clinics continued to close due to the surgical-center requirement, then the 
remaining clinics may need to accommodate an increased capacity by a factor of about five). 
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and did not further Texas’ legitimate interest in protecting women who may have complications 
during a procedure.117 The Court held that the surgical-center requirement unconstitutionally 
placed an undue burden on the fundamental right to abortion.118 
In his dissent, Justice Thomas opposed the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Casey and its 
intent to weigh a law’s burden on abortion access together with the benefit it confers.119 “Casey 
did not balance the benefits and burdens of Pennsylvania’s spousal and parental notification 
provisions, . . . [it] imposed an undue burden because findings established that the requirement 
would ‘likely . . . prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion’—not 
because these burdens outweighed its benefits.”120 This interpretation is “nowhere to be found in 
Casey or its successors, and transform[s] the undue-burden test to something much more akin to 
strict scrutiny.”121  
Whole Woman’s Health raised the level of scrutiny established in Casey.122 Justice 
Breyer’s interpretation appears to also embrace Justice Stevens’ interpretation in his partial 
concurrence and dissent opinion in Casey.123  
The Supreme Court again applied this higher level of scrutiny to laws regulating abortion 
in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo. In Russo, it addressed a nearly identical admitting-
                                                 
117 Id. at 2300. 
118 Id. at 2318. 
119 Id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
120 Id.; see id. at 2325 (noting that it is not the job of the judiciary to assess medical uncertainties to justify 
legislation). 
121 Id. at 2324 (emphasis added). 
122 See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion 
Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 YALE L.J. F. 149 (Oct. 11, 2016) (noting that Whole Woman’s Health might 
reshape abortion rulings with the Court’s application of the undue burden framework). 
123 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, at 920 (“A state-imposed burden on the exercise of a constitutional 
right is measured both by its effects and by its character: a burden may be ‘undue’ either because the burden is too 
severe or because it lacks a legitimate, rational justification.”). 
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privileges requirement in Louisiana.124 Three abortion clinics and two abortion providers sued 
arguing it unconstitutionally “imposed an undue burden on the right of their patients to obtain an 
abortion.”125 In a 5-4 plurality opinion, Justice Breyer applied the same undue burden standard as 
in Whole Woman’s Health; laws furthering a legitimate state interest regulating abortion are 
unconstitutional if it has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman’s right to choose.126 To assess a substantial obstacle, the Court should consider the burdens 
that a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits that a law confers.127 
 First, the Court analyzed the law’s burdens on abortion clinics and providers.128 Evidence 
showed four of these providers tried—in good faith—to obtain admitting privileges but failed “for 
reasons that had nothing to do with their ability to perform abortions safely.”129 Even if providers 
in Louisiana obtained admitting privileges to a nearby hospital, they may lose privileges for failing 
to meet minimum hospital admission requirements due to the low number of complications during 
abortion procedures.130 As a result, many clinics would close leaving only a few to serve large 
areas of Louisiana.131 The Court held that Louisiana’s admitting-privileges requirement placed a 
heavy burden on a woman’s right to an abortion.132 
                                                 
124 June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 at 2112 (2020). 
125 Id. at 2113; see id. at 2118–19 (noting the clinics and providers had proper third-party standing to bring a 
constitutionality claim on behalf of their patients); but see id. at 2142–44 (noting, in dissent, that it is improper for 
courts to hear cases claiming third-party standing under U.S. Constitution Article III’s case-or-controversy 
requirement). 
126 Id. at 2120. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 2122. 
129 Id.; see id. at 2123 (“evidence also shows that opposition to abortion played a significant role in some hospitals’ 
decisions to deny admitting privileges.”). 
130 Id. at 2123; see Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2312 (“hospitals often condition 
admitting privileges on reaching a certain number of admissions per year.”). 
131 June Med. Services L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2128–30 (noting that this would lead to longer wait times, increased 
crowding, and increased travel distances); see id. at 2130 (noting increased travel burdens fall disproportionately on 
poor women who are least able to absorb them). 
132 Id. at 2130. 
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 Second, the Supreme Court assessed the medical benefits of Louisiana’s admitting-
privileges requirement and found none.133 It concluded that “‘[c]omplications from surgical 
abortion are relatively rare,’ and ‘[t]hey very rarely require transfer to a hospital or emergency 
room and are generally not serious.’”134 Furthermore, complications from medically-induced 
abortions usually arise after the patient has left the facility.135 The Court therefore determined that 
the admitting-privileges requirement provided no medical benefit.136 
 After weighing the burdens and benefits of Louisiana’s law, four of the five Justices in the 
majority held that it effectively posed a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s right to an 
abortion.137 The law also did not further Louisiana’s legitimate interest to protect the health and 
safety of women.138 Thus, Louisiana’s admitting-privileges requirement was unconstitutional.139 
 Chief Justice Roberts, in a concurring opinion, signaled his discontent in the Court’s 
application of Casey’s undue burden standard.140 He notes that measuring a law’s potential burden 
together with its benefits is impossible and not a job for this Court: “[C]ourts applying [this] 
balancing test would be asked in essence to weigh the [government’s] interests ‘in protecting the 
potentiality of human life’ and the health of the woman, on one hand, against the woman’s liberty 
interest in defining her ‘own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life’ on the other. There is no plausible sense in which anyone, let alone this Court, could 
                                                 
133 Id. at 2131–32. 
134 Id. at 2131 (citation omitted). 
135 Id. (noting standard protocol “when a patient experiences a complication after returning home from the clinic 
is to send her ‘to the hospital that is nearest and able to provide the service that the patient needs.’ which is not 
necessarily a hospital within 30 miles of the clinic.” (citation omitted)). 
136 Id. at 2132. 
137 Id. at 2133. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 2135 (Roberts, C.J, concurring); see id. at 2134 (noting that the principle of stare decisis (similar cases 
should be decided similarly) called for consistency in the Court’s ruling). 
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objectively assign weight to such imponderable values and no meaningful way to compare them 
if there were. Attempting to do so would be like ‘judging whether a particular line is longer than a 
particular rock is heavy[.]’”141 
Simply put, interpreting the undue burden standard as requiring analysis of the burdens a 
law imposes together with the benefits those laws confer, conflicts with the precedent established 
in Casey and is an improper application of the undue burden standard.142 Chief Justice Roberts’ 
concurrence in Russo is a sign that five members of the Court would disregard any potential 
benefits a law may have when regulating abortion and only focus on whether it poses a substantial 
obstacle to abortion access. 
III. ABORTION RIGHTS IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic is a new unforeseeable burden on existing abortion regulations 
compounding the growing disagreement of judicial interpretation. As of March 18, 2021, there 
have been 29,431,658 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the United States resulting in 535,217 
deaths.143 Early in the pandemic, governors throughout the United States considered abortions 
“non-essential” and closed clinics to preserve personal protective equipment for healthcare 
workers.144 These closures barred women’s access to safe and legal abortions during a critical time 
of their pregnancy. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s latest abortion 
surveillance data from 2016, 91% of the 623,471 recorded abortions occurred within the first 13 
                                                 
141 Id. at 2136 (citation omitted). 
142 Id. 
143 United States COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by State, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases_casesper100klast7days (last updated Mar. 13, 2020, 8:22 PM). 
144 Sackeim, supra note 1; but see Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the 
Courts: The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179 (2020) (arguing that judicial 
review concluding suspension of civil liberties because of a pandemic, and in general, is improper). 
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weeks of pregnancy.145 The decision to close abortion clinics during the pandemic could have 
delayed about 32,732 abortions between March 22 and April 12, 2020.146  
Though many governors now define abortion access as essential healthcare, telemedicine 
may be an important way to access medication abortions while meeting safety guidelines during 
the pandemic. Four policies in the United States impede telemedicine use: 
(1) State laws requiring separate, in-person counseling followed by a waiting period before 
medical or surgical abortion; 
(2) State laws requiring an ultrasound at the time of the abortion; 
(3) State laws mandating the prescribing clinician to be physically present during 
mifepristone administration; and 
(4) The FDA Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) for mifepristone, a 
medical inducing abortion pill, mandating in-person drug dispensing to patients within 
a clinic or hospital setting under supervision of the prescriber.147 
A.  The FDA Regulation of Mifepristone 
 
 In 2000, the FDA approved the use of mifepristone with another pill called misoprostol 
(both used for nonsurgical abortions).148 Recognizing mifepristone can cause incomplete abortions 
or serious bleeding, the FDA administered REMS for mifepristone because of its adverse effects 
requiring that the “drug be dispensed to patients only in certain health care settings,” such as 
                                                 
145 Elizabeth Chloe Romanis et al., COVID-19 and Reproductive Justice in Great Britain and the United States: 
Ensuring Access to Abortion Care During a Global Pandemic, 7 J. L. BIOSCIENCES 1, 4 (2020). 
146 Id. at 4. 
147 Isabel R. Fulcher et al., State and Federal Abortion Restrictions Increase Risk of COVID-19 Exposure by 
Mandating Unnecessary Clinic Visits, 102(6) CONTRACEPTION 385, 385–86 (2020). 
148 Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. U.S. FDA, 472 F. Supp. 3d 183, 189–90 (D. Md. 2020). 
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hospitals, clinics, or offices under the supervision of a certified provider.149 Upon review in 2016, 
the FDA concluded that no new safety concerns arose since 2007, the known serious risks occur 
rarely, and that future serious adverse events will remain low.150 As a result, the FDA allowed 
patients to self-administer “based on the finding that there is ‘no significant difference in either 
efficacy or safety’ for women who take both mifepristone and misoprostol at home as compared 
to women who take mifepristone at a medical office and misoprostol at home.”151 However, the 
FDA still required patients to pick up mifepristone, in person, at a designated health care setting 
while under the supervision of a healthcare provider.152 
 To receive mifepristone, healthcare providers must first determine a patient’s eligibility 
through an interview.153 The FDA does not regulate in what manner this assessment occurs.154 The 
initial interview may occur either in person or through telemedicine.155 Next, the healthcare 
provider counsels the patients on mifepristone’s risks, use of the drug, and follow-up care.156 
Finally, the patient must obtain mifepristone in person at a hospital, clinic, or medical office in 
accordance with FDA regulations.157 
 On March 13, 2020, the president of the United States declared a national emergency in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, giving the secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
emergency authority “to temporarily waive or modify certain requirements of the Medicare, 
                                                 
149 Id. at 191; see 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3)(C) (2020). 
150 Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 190–91. 
151 Id. at 191 (citation omitted). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 192 (noting that the healthcare provider determines whether the patient is less than ten weeks pregnant 
and does not have an ectopic pregnancy). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. (noting that whether the interview occurs in-person or through video depends on the healthcare 









Medicaid, and State Children’s Health Insurance programs . . .” throughout the COVID-19 
outbreak.158 In response, the Secretary of HHS waived in-person dispensing requirements for 
certain drugs but not for mifepristone.159 
Medical professionals and reproductive activists quickly sued the FDA to forgo its required 
in-person distribution of mifepristone during the pandemic in American College of Obstetricians 
& Gynecologists v. United States FDA.160 
B.  Resulting Medication Abortion Care 
 
Diminished access to abortion care is one unintended effect of the recent pandemic. Many 
medical offices have closed or reduced their capacity to comply with government safety 
regulations.161 Procuring transportation to attend the in-person requirement amid the pandemic can 
be particularly difficult for patients with lower incomes as well as minority communities.162  
Arranging childcare during in-person medical visits is another complication for some 
patients. “[T]his challenge is more acute during the pandemic because many schools and daycare 
centers have closed . . . ” and medical offices may not allow patients’ children to come with them 
to appointments.163 Issues with transportation and childcare during the pandemic have also 
disproportionately affected minority communities.164 
                                                 
158 Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, 3 C.F.R. 
§ 1 (2020). 
159 Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 472 F. Supp. 3d at 194 (noting that drugs Spravato and Tysabri 
no longer require in-person dispensing during the COVID-19 pandemic). 
160 Id. at 189. 
161 Id. at 196 (noting that one doctor who testified estimated that her medical office would operate at 25% capacity 
through the spring of 2021). 
162 Id. at 196–97 (noting that 75% of women obtaining abortions are people with low-income and 60% are women 
of color who, according to SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective, rely more heavily on public 
transportation and other modes of transportation that may expose them to risk of infection by COVID-19). 
163 Id. at 197. 
164 Id. at 197–98. (noting that according to an April 2020 study, 61% of Hispanic American and 44% of African 
American families experienced a job or wage loss). 
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 In American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. United States FDA, medical 
experts testified that, “[T]elemedicine can be used to meet the REMS requirements of an 
assessment of an abortion patient, required counseling and discussion of the Patient Agreement 
Form, and securing of a signature on that form without having to meet in person with the patient . 
. . [M]ifepristone can be safely and promptly delivered by mail or delivery services to a patient at 
or near the time of the signing of the Patient Agreement Form. Accordingly, [the medical experts] 
conclude that in light of telemedicine, the In-Person Requirements are medically unnecessary.”165 
 
Though the pandemic placed unintended effects on abortion access, telemedicine appears to 
be a workable alternative to avoid possible burdens on abortion access while continuing to respect 
the benefits of safety furthered by the FDA’s regulation on mifepristone. 
C.  Weighing the Burdens and Benefits During COVID-19 
 
In determining whether the FDA’s in-person dispensing requirement of mifepristone 
unduly burdens a woman’s fundamental right to abortion access in a pandemic, the Federal District 
Court of Maryland followed the Supreme Court’s process in Whole Woman’s Health.166 The 
district court considered the burdens the law imposed on abortion access together with the benefits 
the law confers, to find whether it posed a substantial obstacle to women seeking a medication 
abortion.167 
First, the district court assessed the burdens the in-person dispensing requirement places 
on patients seeking medication abortions.168 Many patients eligible for mifepristone are 
                                                 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 208. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 211–12. 
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susceptible to increased travel costs, difficulties in securing transportation, a potential need to 
arrange childcare, and overwhelming healthcare providers struggling with increased demand 
because of closures.169 Also, “[b]ecause many individuals infected with [COVID-19] lack 
symptoms, . . . any time that abortion patients venture out of their residence, including to fulfill 
the In-Person Requirements, they risk contracting a highly dangerous disease.”170 
The FDA argued that risks to any abortion patient traveling to a medical office is low and 
the overall difficulty of travel does not amount to a substantial obstacle.171 But this argument 
contradicts the FDA’s decision to waive in-person requirements for other drugs to minimize health 
risks.172 The in-person dispensing requirement did pose a substantial obstacle to women seeking 
medication abortions because it posed both safety and economic challenges to the patient.173 
Second, the district court assessed the benefits that the in-person dispensing requirement 
provides patients seeking medication abortions.174 According to Dr. Allison Bryant Mantha (“Dr. 
Bryant”) an OB/GYN at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston and an associate professor at 
Harvard Medical School, “there is no clinical reason to require patients to travel to a clinic, 
hospital, or medical office in person to obtain mifepristone.”175 The court concluded that 
healthcare providers can assess a patient’s eligibility to use mifepristone through telemedicine; if 
a healthcare provider, in their best medical judgment, requires an in-person meeting, then this can 
occur.176 
                                                 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 212. 
171 Id. at 212–13. 
172 Id.; see also id. at 194 (noting that the drugs Spravato and Tysabri no longer require in-person dispensing 
during the pandemic). 
173 Id. at 217. 
174 Id. at 217–18. 
175 Id. at 217. 
176 Id. at 221. 
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The FDA argued that the in-person dispensing requirement is necessary for healthcare 
counseling, mitigating serious risks associated with mifepristone use, and preventing delays in 
filling prescriptions, which may occur through mail or commercial carriers.177 Yet, the court 
emphasized, telemedicine is available to counsel the patient on risks associated with mifepristone 
without meeting in person.178 There is also little evidence that removing the in-person dispensing 
requirement will cause delays in taking the medication, as commercial carriers are capable of 
same-day delivery.179 In fact, there appears to be little actual health benefit to the in-person 
dispensing requirement. According to Dr. Bryant, “[t]here is no safety or medical benefit in 
requiring patients to make a trip to the health care facility just to pick up the mifepristone.”180 
Finally, the district court measured the burdens of the in-person dispensing requirement 
against its benefits. “[T]he more substantial the burden, the stronger the [FDA]’s justification for 
the law must be to satisfy the undue burden test; conversely, the stronger the [FDA]’s justification, 
the greater the burden may be before it becomes ‘undue.’”181 It held that the in-person dispensing 
requirement most likely does pose a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s fundamental 
right to an abortion without adequate justification and therefore is likely unconstitutional.182 
On July 13, 2020, the District Court ruled for the plaintiff’s preliminary injunctive relief 
claim noting “the In-Person Requirements, combined with the COVID-19 pandemic, place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking medication abortion and that may delay or 
                                                 
177 Id. at 218–221. 
178 Id. at 220. 
179 Id. at 221. 
180 Id. at 218. 
181 Id. at 222. 
182 Id. at 223. 
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preclude a medication abortion and thus may necessitate a more invasive procedure.”183 As a 
result, the FDA must allow dispensing mifepristone absent in-person contact unless the prescribing 
physician, in their expert medical opinion, requires an in-person visit.184 This ruling, however, is 
not indefinite. It is only enforceable until this case has finished, or the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services ends the public health emergency declared under 42 U.S.C. § 247d, whichever 
comes first.185 
On August 26, 2020, the FDA appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the in-person 
dispensing requirement is a long-established safety check, there are still surgical methods of 
abortion available, and the pandemic’s incidental effects on abortion access does not make a law 
unconstitutional especially when government action is not the cause.186 On October 8, 2020, the 
Supreme Court denied the FDA’s appeal to review its request to stay the lower court’s order on 
the merits.187 A dissent by Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, accompanied the Court’s denial 
for review expressing the inconsistencies in the Court’s recent rulings on “COVID-19-related 
public safety measures.”188  
In South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, the Supreme Court upheld a 
Governor’s Executive Order limiting attendance of public gatherings three months earlier.189 
Religious institutions argued this order violated their right to religious practice under the Free 
                                                 
183 Id. at 227. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 233. 
186 Application for a Stay at 3, FDA v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 10 (2020) (No. 
20A34). 
187 FDA v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 10 (2020); see Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court 
Punts on Abortion Pills, Allowing Them To Be Mailed—For Now, NPR News (Oct. 8, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/10/08/921921889/supreme-court-refuses-to-block-lower-court-order-on-abortion-pills. 
188 Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. at 11 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
189 S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (mem.). 
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Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.190 Though the Executive Order limited the number of 
worshipers in a church, it also limited public gatherings in secular settings and so did not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause.191 Furthermore, public officials have broad discretion when acting in 
areas of medical and scientific uncertainty in the interest of public safety.192 The Court allowed 
government intrusion to an individual’s First Amendment fundamental right to gather and freely 
practice religion by giving elected officials broad discretion in actions furthering the health and 
safety of the public during a pandemic. But it did not review the FDA’s appeal to enforce its in-
person dispensing requirement furthering protection of women who wish to obtain an abortion. 
Justice Alito noted that decisions by an unelected federal judiciary, lacking medical 
expertise, should give latitude to the government’s medical experts.193 “While COVID-19 has 
provided the ground for restrictions on First Amendment rights, the District Court saw the 
pandemic as a ground for expanding the abortion right recognized in Roe v. Wade.”194   
D.  Abortion Rights Without the Benefit of Assessing Medical Benefits 
 
If the Supreme Court continues to defer to the legislature when assessing medical benefits 
of laws regulating abortion, then judicial protection of a woman’s fundamental right to abortion 
will diminish. Following Russo, lower courts are already following Chief Justice Roberts’ 
                                                 
190 Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
191 Id. (noting the Governor’s Executive Order limiting attendance in public gatherings applied to places of 
worship, lectures, concerts, movie showings, sporting events, and theatrical performances). 
192 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that a mandatory smallpox vaccination was 
constitutional because it substantially furthered government official’s constitutional duty to promote the safety and 
health of the public); see Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974) (giving broad discretion to Congress’ actions 
allowing a drug rehabilitation option for those with two offenses or less under the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act 
of 1966 because it is an action in an area of medical and scientific uncertainty). 
193 Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. at 12. 
194 Id. at 12; but see Ariane Frosh, Reproducing Equality: How COVID-19 Can Strengthen Abortion Rights, 68 
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 80 (2020) (noting that the pandemic laid bare the inadequacies of traditional constitutional 
interpretation to protect women’s reproductive rights when it does not account for socioeconomic context of women 
seeking safe and legal abortions). 
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interpretation of Casey instead of Justice Breyer’s interpretation.  
In EMWomen’s Surgical Center P.S.C. v. Friedlander, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit determined the constitutionality of a Kentucky regulation “requiring abortion 
facilities to obtain transfer agreements with a local hospital and transport agreements with local 
ambulance service[s].”195 When a Supreme Court opinion garners a split majority, as in Russo, 
lower courts must “treat the ‘position taken by [the Justice or Justices] who concurred in the 
judgment[] on the narrowest grounds’ as ‘the holding of the Court.’”196 Justice Breyer’s 
interpretation in Russo, judicially scrutinizing a law’s medical benefits, would presumably 
invalidate more laws than Chief Justice Roberts’ interpretation.197 Chief Justice Roberts’ 
concurrence therefore controls as precedent for lower courts in abortion-related cases.198 
 Following Chief Justice Roberts in Russo, the Sixth Circuit Court determined that a law 
regulating abortion is valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest and does not have 
the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus.199 
Like the government’s health-related justifications for its admitting-privileges requirement 
in Whole Woman’s Health and Russo, Kentucky justified its transfer—and transport—requirement 
as a safety precaution if abortion-related complications arise in its facilities.200 The Circuit Court 
reasoned that “state and federal legislatures [have] wide discretion to pass legislation in areas 
                                                 
195 EMWomen’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2020). 
196 Id. at 431 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
197 Id at 431–33. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 432–34. 
200 Id. at 439. 
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where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”201 Courts, therefore, lack the authority to 
determine whether a state’s reason for its regulation is medically sensible.202 Kentucky’s 
transfer—and transport—requirement is a reasonable protection for women who suffer 
complications during an abortion procedure and is reasonably related to Kentucky’s legitimate 
interest in protecting the health of women seeking abortion.203 
 For Kentucky’s transfer—and transport—requirement to pose a substantial obstacle in the 
path of women seeking an abortion, abortion clinics must show that their facilities would close if 
the requirement took effect despite making a good faith attempt to comply.204 Kentucky’s abortion 
clinics failed to do so.205 Following Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence in Russo, the Circuit Court 
upheld Kentucky’s transfer—and transport—requirement because it was reasonably related to a 
legitimate state interest and did not pose a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an 
abortion.206 
The Supreme Court will continue to give greater deference to legislatures in abortion-
related cases when medical benefits are at play.207 This approach once again effectively lowers the 
Court’s scrutiny in such cases. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Supreme Court’s protection of the constitutional right to abortion expands and 
                                                 
201 Id. at 438 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007)); see June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 
S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment); see Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (holding that Congress’ 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was constitutional by deferring to the Legislature’s medical justifications). 
202 EMWomen’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C., 978 F.3d at 438. 
203 Id. at 438–39. 
204 Id. at 440; see June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2141 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
205 EMWomen’s Surgical Ctr., 978 F.3d at 442–45. 
206 Id. at 446. 
207 See June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2157 (Alito, J., dissenting); see EMWomen’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C., 
978 F.3d at 438 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts’ interpretation of the undue burden test in Russo is the controlling 
standard and calls for deference to legislative bodies when determining a law’s health benefits when regulating 
abortion). 
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contracts as the Court changes its members. In Roe, the Court greatly expanded women’s access 
to safe abortion procedures by establishing a fundamental right and prohibiting governmental 
regulation in the first trimester. In Casey, the Court limited this right by allowing government to 
regulate abortion during pre-viability so long as it had a legitimate purpose to do so, and its law 
did not pose a substantial obstacle to women seeking a safe and legal abortion. In Whole Woman’s 
Health, the Court interpreted Casey’s undue burden standard as requiring analysis of a law’s 
burden on women’s access to abortion as well as its medical benefits effectively raising the 
required judicial scrutiny in abortion-related cases. Last year in Russo, a majority of the Supreme 
Court no longer agrees with this interpretation. 
Roe v. Wade’s fundamental right to a safe and legal abortion is part of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence. But women’s realization of this fundamental right may garner limited judicial 
protection for years to come due to unforeseen difficulties brought by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
as well as growing disagreement on the Supreme Court. 
* * * 
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